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network externalities
John McGee and Tanya Sammut-Bonnici
AN ECONOMIC FORCE FOR THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY
A previous entry (Competitive Market Theory)
outlined the traditional economic model that
was driven by economies of scale and scope. The
digital world, characterized by information and
communications technology, is governed by a
different dynamic. Network externalities are the
new drivers of the network economy. It is impor-
tant to recognize that economies of scale/scope
and network externalities represent the extreme
ends of a spectrum of effects, and that the
presence of one does not imply the exclusion of
the other. Companies may experience the effects
of both to varying degrees, with a tendency
for network externalities to have more strategic
relevance in the digitized network economy.
The concept of network externalities has
attracted the attention of academics and prac-
titioners alike. The extent to which network
industries have proliferated in the economy is
a recent phenomenon. The effects of network
externalities, however, have been recognized
for some time, with the development of the
older network companies such as the railroads
and the electricity systems. In 1804, Trevithick
constructed the first practical locomotive in
England. In 1882, the Edison Electric Lighting
Company completed the first commercial gener-
ating station atHolborn Viaduct in London. The
first commercial telephone line was installed in
Boston, Massachusetts, in 1877.
Network externalities are defined as the
increasing utility that a user derives from
consumption of a product as the number of
other users who consume the same product
increases. For example, the more people there
are in a telephone network, the more users can
be reached on the network, thereby increasing
its usability. Fax machines, broadcast industry
services, credit card networks, and computer
hardware and software are examples of products
exhibiting network externalities.
The exponential adoption of a network
service, which is subject to network externali-
ties, is evident in the rapid rise of peer-to-peer
networks in three main categories: social
networks, e-marketplaces, and information ser-
vices, such as Facebook, eBay, and Wikipedia.
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND THE BATTLE
FOR CRITICAL MASS
For normal goods, the demand curve slopes
downward. As price decreases, more of the
product is demanded. Other elements in the
demand function, such as income or adver-
tising, serve as “demand shifters” that elevate
demand to a higher level. Figure 1 illustrates
the traditional role of a demand shifter. Higher
levels of consumption are derived from higher
incomes (positive income elasticities) or from
lower prices (negative price elasticities).
This fundamental relationship is greatly
distorted in the presence of network external-
ities. In the presence of network externalities,
we specify that sales rise as accumulated sales
(the installed base) rise. However, there may be
a chicken-and-egg problem. That is, customers
may not be interested in purchasing because
the installed base is small and/or not expected
to grow. For example, imagine the purchase of
complex software without internet support, help
lines, and user groups. Alternatively, there may
be confident expectations that the installed base
will grow substantially and therefore consumers
will confidently make purchases. The paradox
is that consumers will not buy if the installed
base is too low. But, the installed base is too low
because customers will not buy. The crux of the
paradox lies in the management of consumer
expectations. In markets for normal goods,
equilibrium is explained in terms of a balance
between costs and demand, between marginal
costs and marginal utility. In network markets,
there is also equilibrium to be struck between
actual demand and consumer expectations of
total demand.
This gives rise to an economic paradox.
Almost the first law of economics is that value
comes from scarcity. However, in the digital
economy, value comes from plenty: the more
something is demanded and the more it is
expected to be demanded, then the more valu-
able it becomes. Expectations are so important
in driving demand that a point exists where the
momentum is so overwhelming that success
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Figure 2 Winner takes all.
becomes a runaway event and we observe a
“winner-takes-all” phenomenon (Figure 2).
The “tipping point” is when the installed base
(i.e., the size of the network) tips expectations
sharply toward one player (or one network)
and away from its rival. We observed this effect
when the market moved toward Windows as the
prevailing computer operating system, rather
than OS2. Another example of tipping would
be IBM-compatibles versus Apple, as shown in
Figure 3. The tipping point comes somewhere
in 1984–5 when IBM system sales overtake
those of Apple.
The tipping point mechanism in the computer
industry had the effect of determining the
pattern of market shares for a long time to come.
Apple computer sales continued to remain at a
constant level, showing a market share of 7.8%
at the end of 2008. The market is showing signs
of shifting upward slightly in 2009 and beyond
as Apple’s popularity increased with the success
of its iPod product. Apple has clearly shifted its
focus from the PC industry to competing in the
market for network devices.
Another example is the tipping of the digital
video disk (DVD) market toward Blu-ray and
away from HD-DVD in 2008. The development
of Blu-ray was initiated in 2002 byMIT and nine
technology corporations: Hitachi, LG, Pana-
sonic, Philips, Pioneer, Sony, Sharp, Samsung,
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Figure 3 Market shares of Apple and IBM in the nascent phase of the computer industry.
and Thomson Electronics. HD-DVD was
supported principally by Toshiba. In the 6 years
that followed, Toshiba and Sony spent heavily
on public relations campaigns to proclaim the
benefits of their respective technologies. The
markets were used to try out new ideas through
product announcements as well the video players
in test markets. The process led to conflicting
media messages and confusion in consumers’
minds as to which standard was technologically
superior. Marketing efforts were not sufficient
to tip market shares in favor of one side or the
other, nor was the mechanism of free choice in
a competitive market. Consumer expectations
as to which technology will win the standards
war became unclear. Revenues of video players
declined as consumers waited for the market to
settle before investing in new equipment.
In February 2008, after a drawn-out standards
battle between Blu-ray and HD-DVD, Toshiba
announced that it had ceased to develop and
manufacture the HD-DVD players or drives. In
the same period, Warner Brothers Entertain-
ment, which made part of the Blu-ray camp,
announced that it would not release films on the
HD-DVD format. Warner Brothers Entertain-
ment’s intervention was intended to dislodge
the stalemate caused by the battle of DVD
standards. Both Toshiba and Warner Brothers
showed market sensitivity to consumer expec-
tations and acted in the interest of allowing the
market to move forward.
The exception to the winner-takes-all
phenomenon would be a regulated network
market with strong interconnections between
competing platforms. The mobile telephone
industry is a classic example. The standards are
harmonized across the network providers, at
least by continental region. The platforms are
interlinked and the sales curves of the regulated
network providers follow the pattern of the
overall subscription curve for the industry.
Traditional economic thinking is based
on negative feedback systems in which the
strong get weaker at the margin and the weak
get stronger, thus providing a drive toward
a competitive equilibrium. This is captured
in economics by the concept of diminishing
marginal utility as consumption grows. In the
New World of networks, feedback rules. In this
world, the valuation of a product increases the
more that others consume the product. Strictly
speaking, it arises from the interdependence
of consumer decisions, whereas diminishing
marginal utility dominates when consumer deci-
sions are independent – the normal assumption
in economics.
The price–quantity relationship is normally
held to be downward sloping, but the demand
curve for a network product should be drawn
differently (Figure 4). The value to the
consumer of a network product is reflected
in the price he is willing to pay – the vertical
axis. The principal driver of value is the size of
the network, also referred to as the installed base,
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Figure 4 The network demand curve: the idea of optimal size.
and is shown on the horizontal axis. Quantity
demanded does still have an effect on price,
but for these products this is secondary to the
network effect.
The initial upward slope of the curve reflects
a rising valuation at the margin, as consumers
perceive that they gain value by virtue of
other consumers having the product. Being
on the Wintel standard gives value to new
users. However, as the network grows, the extra
consumers at the margin are less valuable – that
is, this shape assumes that those users with
higher potential valuation of the network will
join first. As the network gets very large, further
growth has less value for future customers. The
intercept on the vertical axis represents the
value the network product has as a stand-alone
product. Thus a Wintel computer has some
standalone value, but a telephone has no value
on its own and is a pure network good.
There is a notion of an optimal size of a
network. This can be seen from the interaction
of demand and cost so that, as less and less
valuable customers join the network, there may
come a time when the costs of acquiring and
servicing new customers begin to exceed the
price those customers are willing to pay. This
determines the optimal size and has significant
implications for competition.
The three configurations shown in Figure 5
indicate the range of possibilities. The first
is a pure network good, such as a telephone
system, in which the optimal size of network is
a very high proportion of the available market.
This implies that there is little or no room for
rival networks. The second is a product with a
significant intrinsic value that attracts a modest
size group of users. For example, this could be
a corporate software package (e.g., enterprise
solutions) that attracts dedicated user support
from the supplier through the Web. Alternative
networks could coexist. The third case is one
of very high intrinsic demand, but extensive
consumer interactions (small in size but several
in number) provide a substantial total network
value. The obvious example is word processing
software where the value from standardizing
on MS Word is very high with the result that
alternative standards (such as WordPerfect) are
being frozen out of the market even though the
intrinsic value of any word processing package
is high.
Networks were originally analyzed on the
assumption that each network was owned by
a single firm, and research concentrated on
the efficient use of the network structure and
on the appropriate allocation of costs. With
the antitrust cases against AT&T and its later
breakup, attention shifted toward economies of
scope, the efficiency gains from joint operation of
complementary components of networks. This
led to issues of interconnection and compati-
bility in parallel with the reduced role of IBM in
the 1980s and 1990s in the setting of technical
standards in computer hardware and software.
As technology has advanced, there have been
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Figure 5 Alternative network demand configurations.
significant reductions in telecommunications
costs and a shift toward fragmented owner-
ship of telecommunications networks. Market
structure has shifted from natural monopoly to
oligopoly. Similar trends are evident in other
IT-intensive industries. Thus, the focus of
interest in network economics has shifted from
the analysis of natural monopoly toward issues of
interconnection, compatibility, interoperability,
and coordination of quality.
See also competitive market theory; critical mass;
network industry strategies; networks
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